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strategically destabilising effects of Brexit and the Trump administration. Accordingly, 
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original ambition suggested it should be, but is light on specific policies and their 
delivery. The accompanying publications from the Ministry of Defence contain more 
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A ‘disintegrated review’?
Global Britain in a Competitive Age, published on 16 March 2021 with a foreword by 
the Prime Minister, was not the Integrated Review’s sole statement on security and 
foreign policy. It was accompanied a week later by a Command Paper called Defence 
in a competitive age. Introduced by the Secretary of State for Defence, that in turn was 
underpinned by the Integrated Operating Concept 2025, which set out a common 
 doctrine for all three services and had been launched by the Chief of Defence Staff  on 
30 September 2020. Anticipating the vocabulary which would be used both in Global 
Britain and in the Defence Command Paper, the Chief of Defence Staff  described the 
United Kingdom as facing an era of persistent competition, in which ‘sunrise capabil-
ities’ like cyber, big data and artificial intelligence would compensate for a diminishing 
number of platforms and reductions in personnel. In the tradition of the Dreadnought 
battleship, the long-range heavy bomber and the atomic bomb – all of which Britain 
had pioneered in its approach to war – the United Kingdom would maximise its 
 firepower through innovative technologies.
Nor has the production line in fresh strategic thinking stopped with these three 
documents. More is to come. Defence in a competitive age promised a Defence and 
Security Industrial Strategy as well as a two-pronged approach to climate change, one 
prong to reduce defence’s carbon footprint and the other to enable the armed forces 
to adapt better to operations in changing environments. Global Britain heralded a new 
international development strategy, ‘a comprehensive cyber strategy’ built around the 
National Cyber Force and an ‘integrated space strategy’ based on a new Space 
Command. Most significantly it said that the Government would start to develop ‘a 
comprehensive national resilience strategy in 2021, in partnership with the devolved 
administrations and English regions, local government, the private sector and the 
public’.1 The two most obvious challenges to national security in 2020-21 were 
 primarily domestic: the COVID-19 pandemic and the threat to the Union represented 
by the consequences of Brexit, both for Northern Ireland and the Good Friday 
 agreement and for the boost it gave to Scottish nationalism. Although Global Britain 
name-checks the Union several times, it does not present a strategy for its preserva-
tion. Here, as elsewhere, the tone is aspirational, with intentions spelt out, but with 
specific policy and precise implementation left for later.
The accusation that follows from this proliferation of strategies, that the review 
was characterised more by disintegration than integration, was reinforced by the fact 
that the Government had pre-empted its conclusions by taking three key decisions 
1 HM Government (2021: 88, para 4.8). The layout of the paragraphs is not consistent across chapters, so 
making referencing inconsistent, and is entirely absent in the ‘accessible’ version.
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before its publication. On 17 June 2020 the Department for International Development 
was merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The implicit subordination 
of the place of international aid in a joined-up vision of national security was con-
firmed by a cut in its budget from 0.7 per cent of national income to 0.5 per cent. That 
reduction promises to be much higher in real terms given the drop in national income 
precipitated by the pandemic and to be felt particularly in conflict zones, including 
those in which Britain has been involved, given the prioritisation of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ 
at the expense of the Middle East and Afghanistan. The latter, Congo and Syria are 
confronting falls in British aid of around 60 per cent. British NGOs working to pro-
mote security and development are turning for support to governments other than 
that of the United Kingdom, while simultaneously finding themselves shut out from 
ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, a funding 
 programme worth about 1 billion euros a year) as a result of Brexit. The de-mining 
charity, the HALO Trust, based in Scotland and supported in her lifetime by Princess 
Diana, was originally set up to address Afghanistan’s problems after the Soviet 
 invasion. It has had to slash its workforce (many of them ex-Taliban fighters) by a 
third and those funded by the British government have fallen from 1,000 to 65. Fewer 
de-miners mean fewer insurgents and other former combatants in constructive 
employment and less safety for farmers working the land in an impoverished society. 
The work of such NGOs marches in step with the Ministry of Defence’s proposal for 
persistent engagement in an era of ‘constant competition’. The decision to cut the aid 
budget does not just undermine the claim that the policies pursued by ‘Global Britain’ 
are integrated but also robs them of effectiveness. 
Two other announcements made before March 2021, both delivered on 19 November 
2020, can be seen in a better light, as enablers not disablers. The creation of the 
National Cyber Force, a collaborative venture between GCHQ and the Ministry of 
Defence to counter Britain’s adversaries, including states, terrorists and criminals, by 
both the defensive and offensive use of cyber, established a body from which strategy 
might flow. The Treasury’s commitment of an extra £24 billion for defence over four 
years was welcomed by the Chief of Defence Staff  as providing the headroom which 
will enable the Ministry of Defence to shed ‘sunset’ capabilities and to take risks in 
research and development as it searches for quality over quantity.
The most influential defence review in shaping the direction of British strategy for 
the post-Cold War era, that of 1998, was much lauded for being ‘strategy, not Treasury-
led’. Despite the £24 billion headline, the same claim cannot be made for the Integrated 
Review. Much of the new money does little more than reverse recent cuts. Its leading 
symbols, the two aircraft carriers, are a direct legacy of the 1998 review. The real 
 problem is somewhat different. The presumption that economics are the enemy of 
good strategy is misplaced. The need to balance what you might like to do with what 
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you can afford to do, or more realistically what you might be prepared to spend, is one 
of the key disciplines within strategy. It shapes priorities and so determines choices. 
Global Britain is characterised by a reluctance to make choices and has added 
 commitments which it is neither equipped nor resourced to meet.
In some respects little has changed. For the time being (pending any disruption if  
Scotland were to become independent), Britain’s geography has given its strategic 
 posture a default position which suggests an underlying continuity. The 1998 Strategic 
Defence Review, which led to the orders for the two carriers, used Britain’s island 
status to make a virtue of its global reach from a secure base in ways which find echoes 
in the Integrated Review. It prioritised expeditionary capabilities centred on air- 
maritime forces. After the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2015 National Security 
Strategy reverted to that posture by taking the security of the British Isles as a hub 
from which it could establish and project a tri-service expeditionary force. To be ready 
in 2025, the Joint Force was to include not just aircraft carriers and F-35 jets but also 
an independent British ISTAR [intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and 
 reconnaissance] capability and a deployable combat division. 
This continuity is deceptive. It can also be read as the product of a single but 
major procurement decision, the commitment to build the two carriers. In 2010, when 
David Cameron came into office, he was persuaded that their cancellation at such a 
late stage would be as expensive as their continuation. Even then it remained possible 
until at least 2015 that only one would enter service with the Royal Navy, with the 
other being sold abroad. The 1998 review had been bent out of shape in 2001 by the 
9/11 attacks. The government responded in July 2002 with some additional ideas on 
counter-terrorism in The Strategic Defence Review: A new chapter, the very title of 
which reflected the determination not to change course and showed a misplaced faith 
in continuity. The subsequent decade and a half  were marked not by the use of air and 
sea power in rapid interventions but by protracted land warfare. Bizarrely, at no stage 
has British national security policy directly addressed the collective lessons of the 
conflicts in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan and their implications. Although the Ministry 
of Defence has paid due attention to the Chilcot report on Iraq, no other government 
department has followed suit, and the Integrated Review dismisses Afghanistan in 
two separate brief, uninformative and now-outdated sentences. 
In other words, strategy rarely runs in straight lines. The 2010 National Security 
Strategy, which had to deal with the consequences of the 2008-9 crash and was intro-
duced by a government bent on cutting debt, was ‘disintegrated’ in ways not dissimilar 
to the Integrated Review. It too was accompanied by a separate paper on defence, the 
Strategic Defence and Security Review, and that in turn deferred reductions in the 
Army’s manpower (but not in those of the other two services) until 2014, the year in 
which it ceased major combat operations in Afghanistan. 
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In 2015 the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review were folded into a single document, but that apparent unity did not prevent 
disintegration. The commitments undertaken in 2015 were not fully funded. The crash 
was predicted to come in the early 2020s with the procurement of a successor to the 
Vanguard-class ballistic-missile nuclear submarines. Even the Ministry of Defence 
conceded that its successor, the Dreadnought class, approved in 2016, would consume 
6 per cent of its budget, and the problem was compounded by the pending replace-
ment of the warheads on its missile, the US-built Trident D 5. Furthermore, at the end 
of 2016 Britain had to respond to the changing political context created by the Brexit 
referendum and the election of Donald Trump as US President. In 2017, therefore, it 
embarked on an update to the 2015 review, so breaking with the five-year cycle 
 established in 2010. The result, the National Security Capability Review of March 
2018, ruptured the wider security framework established by the National Security 
Strategy in 2010 in other ways too. The Secretary of State for Defence, Gavin 
Williamson, successfully fought for a separate Modernising Defence Programme, 
announced nine months later. 
At the heart of the arguments for a unified concept of national security, expressed 
in 2010 not only in the National Security Strategy but also in the creation of the 
National Security Council and of the post of National Security Adviser, are three 
principles. First, security embraces not just ‘hard’ defence but also responses to  natural 
disasters like floods and pandemics. Moreover, the two are not necessarily divisible: a 
hostile actor might well exploit the opportunities created by the latter. Second, in an 
era of real-time communications and social media, external and internal threats inter-
act and feed off  each other. As Gordon Brown was wont to put it when he was prime 
minister, British troops in Helmand were keeping the streets safe at home. Although 
the growth of the national security architecture was initially prompted by global 
 terrorism undertaken by non-state actors (a topic barely touched on by the Integrated 
Review), the Russian attacks on the Skripals in Salisbury in 2018 made clear that this 
second principle had a state dimension. Third, effective responses require joint 
 working that crosses the boundaries between government departments. 
The Ministry of Defence had learnt in Iraq and Afghanistan that it had to  combine 
military action with political effects and development projects, delivered in conjunc-
tion with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International 
Development. It called this the ‘comprehensive approach’. In 2018 the National 
Security Adviser, Mark Sedwill, reflected his own experience in Afghanistan by devel-
oping what he called ‘fusion doctrine’ as a centrepiece of the 2018 National Security 
Capability Review. Problems which required an integrated, cross-departmental 
approach would be identified as such, with both funds and staff  (specifically a Senior 
Responsible Officer) dedicated to their resolution. 
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By 2020 these efforts to embed integration in Whitehall were floundering. The 
National Security Council itself  failed to meet for long periods – and early in the pan-
demic not at all – and was less regularly chaired by the Prime Minister than it had 
been under his predecessors. Sedwill, by then Cabinet Secretary as well as National 
Security Adviser, found himself  under attack from within government and in June 
2020 the Prime Minister announced his replacement as National Security Adviser by 
David Frost, despite the fact that he too was already fully committed as Britain’s 
 principal Brexit negotiator. Global Britain makes just one passing reference to the 
‘fusion doctrine’ and says little about progress towards its implementation. The 
Defence Command Paper mentions the need to go beyond the fusion doctrine but 
does not say where to.2 Neither document mentions the Joint Force. Although the 
carrier strike group is central to both, the deployable division is not. What is left is a 
deployable divisional headquarters but with one less brigade and its other capabilities 
in flux. The army’s principal heavy-lift aircraft is being retired, it will not have a 
 successor main battle tank until 2030, and it may no longer have armoured infantry. 
Strategy
Unlike its predecessors in 2010 and 2015, Global Britain is much more explicit about 
strategy. ‘The Government’, it says immediately before its mention of the fusion 
 doctrine, ‘will need to combine a planned strategy – which sets long-term objectives, 
anticipates challenges along the way, and charts a course towards them – with an 
adaptive approach.’3 When David Cameron was Prime Minister, he fought shy of such 
definitions and resisted the pressures exerted by his Chief of the Defence Staff  to 
think in terms of strategy. Like many politicians he wanted to retain the flexibility to 
react to circumstances as they unfolded and saw strategy as a straitjacket, rather than 
as a springboard to adaptability. The Integrated Review establishes a strategic frame-
work resting on four ‘overarching and mutually supporting objectives’: sustaining 
economic advantage through science and technology; shaping the open international 
order of the future; strengthening security and defence at home and overseas; and 
building resilience at home and overseas. These seem unexceptionable and unlikely to 
shift. However, while the Prime Minister’s foreword and the Integrated Review as a 
whole reach out to 2030, the strategic framework’s objectives are fixed only to 2025. 
Presumably, therefore, they are the means which by 2030 will deliver Global Britain’s 
long-term aims. So what are those aims? 
2 HM Government (2021: 19, para 2.34); Ministry of Defence (2021: 13, para 3.7).
3 HM Government (2021: 19, para 2.34).
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The National Security Strategies of the last decade defined Britain’s role in the 
world in conservative if  over-arching terms. Its aim was to preserve the rules-based 
international order. Originally embraced by the Labour government as a unifying 
theme for its Defence Green Paper, published in February 2010 in advance of the 
election of that year, the rules-based international order became a formulation that 
commanded cross-party consensus. Theresa May reiterated it on several occasions 
when she was prime minister, not least when she went to visit the newly elected Trump 
in January 2017. However, repetition deprived it of resonance. It also rang hollow, 
sometimes domestically and certainly among non-aligned and adversarial states. Since 
9/11, Britain has proved a rule breaker as much as a rule maker. In March 2003 it 
joined the United States in invading Iraq without the authorisation of a second UN 
Security Council Resolution. In 2011 it enjoyed a UN mandate to intervene in Libya 
but only in order to protect the non-combatant population of Benghazi, not to go on 
to effect regime change. These may be old charges but there are others of current 
 relevance. One has been Britain’s conduct or threatened conduct in the Brexit nego-
tiations and in the handling of the Northern Ireland protocol, both issues settled by 
inter national agreements. Brexit too affected Gibraltar, which as a colony has no 
 separate standing in the eyes of the EU or UN. Britain has expanded Gibraltar’s 
 habitable territory by dredging, action which in Spain’s eyes is at odds with the treaty 
of Utrecht, which in 1713 ceded the port and fortifications but not the isthmus which 
connects them to the mainland. This is an issue which also weakens Britain’s defence 
of the rules-based order in its ‘competition’ with China, especially with regard to the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which both countries (unlike the United 
States) are signatories. While Britain attacks China’s behaviour in the South China 
Sea, it rejects the UN’s criticism of its own stance on the Chagos Islands and  especially 
Diego Garcia. Such policies are not necessarily wrong or unwise, but they underline 
how even principled states are selective in their interpretations of the rules. The 
Integrated Review has now therefore concluded that ‘a change of approach’ is required. 
It believes that, because ‘the international order is … characterised by intensifying 
competition between states over interests, norms and values’, ‘preserving the post-
Cold War “rules-based international system”’ and ‘a defence of the status quo’ are ‘no 
longer sufficient for the decade ahead’. Britain, it would seem, despite the line regu-
larly adopted by the Foreign Secretary, is poised to abandon its defence of the rules.4
There is another significant change. National Security Strategies since 2010 have 
used a register to categorise risks, based on likelihood and impact. A pandemic was 
consistently rated as a tier-one risk and yet the country was caught unprepared by 
COVID-19, so undermining the apparent utility of the risk register. Moreover, a 
4 HM Government (2021: 11, para 2.5).
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 strategy weighted towards the mitigation of threats and vulnerabilities carried other 
negative consequences. It made Britain slow to detect opportunities and reluctant to 
reap the rewards of a more adventurous approach. The narrowly military roots of 
strategy are relevant here. Defence tends to involve spreading resources too thinly in 
order to cover all eventualities; offence permits concentration of effort and the pursuit 
of a clear objective. It may be going too far to describe the Integrated Review as offen-
sive rather than defensive, but it emphasises the need to preserve Britain’s freedom of 
action in terms not simply consistent with post-Brexit ambitions but also reflective 
of the need to exploit opportunity by being proactive, not reactive.
Any strategy is fully tested only when put into practice; the ways in which it 
explains its intentions are merely words. The ‘disintegration’ of national strategies is 
not just a product of events – the 9/11 attacks in the case of the 1998 Strategic Defence 
Review or the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 – but is also contingent on the determina-
tion, or otherwise, of a government to oversee their implementation. In its 2015 
National Security Strategy, the Cameron government identified the ‘decay and failure 
of key institutions’ as a risk, while simultaneously introducing a referendum on 
Britain’s membership of one such institution, the European Union. Strategy may 
adapt to unforeseen events and then resume course, as the definition of strategy in 
Global Britain suggests. Alternatively, events, however short-term their consequences, 
can swamp the best intentions and so have long-lived effects. Strategies which are alert 
to possible second- and third-order consequences are likely to prove more resilient 
than those which are not. Before 1982 Britain was bent on concentrating its defensive 
effort in Europe in order to confront the threat from the Soviet Union. Argentina saw 
that as its opportunity to invade the Falkland Islands, with the result that 40 years on 
the Falklands and their staging post, Ascension Island, remain core defence 
 commitments in the Integrated Review. 
The difficulties are compounded because strategy-making rarely follows as ordered 
and logical a framework as its rational models propose. This does not mean that 
 strategy behaves irrationally. It is just that, as a collective endeavour, it is made by 
many hands, not a single intelligence. Global Britain, with its internal contradictions 
(having ditched the rules-based order, it goes on to vaunt multilateralism in terms 
which resurrect it, invoking ‘rules’ 27 times), is a particularly striking example of that 
tendency encapsulated in a single document. Logically top-down direction from 
 government should result in planning and implementation by Whitehall, but the 
 process proves more iterative than that. Most national strategies – and the Integrated 
Review is no exception – begin with some bottom-up thinking, especially in the 
Ministry of Defence. The options that emerge may then be constrained by party 
 political pressures or by the individual politician’s appetite for risk. In the case of the 
Integrated Review, the capacity to list options without ranking them, to express 
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 desirable outcomes while leaving concrete delivery to later ‘strategies’ and to resist 
matching aspiration with capability, leaves it more vulnerable than most. 
Strategy in practice
Neither of the National Security Strategies of 2010 or of 2015 was explicit about the 
identity of its adversaries. The Integrated Review is. Global Britain names Russia as 
‘the most acute direct threat to the UK’ and describes China ‘as a systemic competi-
tor’. The distinction in the wording is important. Much has been made of the review’s 
‘tilt to the Indo-Pacific’, as though what was promised was a reversal of the decision 
taken by the Labour government in 1968 to withdraw from east of Suez. In truth 
Britain never fully left, thanks in part to Gurkha recruitment in Nepal and training in 
Brunei, and it returned in force when it invaded Iraq and Afghanistan. The reliance of 
its oil supply and maritime trade on freedom of navigation in the Gulf and Indian 
Ocean has given it a persistent interest in those waters, made evident by its establish-
ment of naval bases in Bahrain in 2014 and Oman in 2019, its retention of Diego 
Garcia (which was essential for its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan), and the 
 creation of a defence staff  in Singapore. What is new is the extension of these defence 
interests into the world’s largest ocean, the Pacific. While recognising Britain’s existing 
commitment to what it calls the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ region, the Integrated Review gives 
Britain a strategy which is more explicitly global certainly than that of China5 and 
arguably even of the United States. 
There may be a danger of exaggeration here. The wording of Global Britain on 
China breaks less definitively with David Cameron’s pursuit of China as a commercial 
and economic partner than human rights concerns over Uighurs or protests over 
Hong Kong might suggest. What worries Global Britain is that ‘the momentum for 
trade liberalisation may continue to slow and cases of protectionism increase, driven 
by political and economic conditions within states and an increasingly aggressive use 
of economic and trade policy as a lever in competition between states’. Seemingly 
oblivious to the ironies implicit in Britain’s own withdrawal from one free-trading 
community, it argues that ‘open, trading economies like the UK will need to engage 
with China and remain open to Chinese trade and investment, but they must also 
protect themselves against practices that have an adverse effect on prosperity and 
security’.6 China, in other words, is presented as both an economic competitor and a 
trading partner, but not as a military threat. However indirect its choice of words, 
5 See Fravel (2019) for the geographical focus of China’s strategy.
6 HM Government (2021: 26, chapter 3) (there are no para numbers in this chapter).
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Global Britain seems to accept that it cannot have it both ways – and that is true not 
just of China, but also of those it seeks as regional allies, whose proximity to an 
increasingly assertive hegemon makes them wary of overtly hostile posturing, not 
least by those who might wish to present themselves as allies, like Britain. 
Defence in a competitive age sees China differently. It treats China, as well as 
Russia, as a military competitor. Presenting China’s rise as ‘by far the most significant 
geopolitical factor in the world today’, it identifies its navy as the world’s largest and 
warns that in the air it will soon have ‘a full spectrum’ of capabilities. China’s military 
modernisation is, it says, ‘proceeding faster than any other nation’ and its behaviour 
in the Indo-Pacific region is ‘increasingly assertive’.7 Led by the Royal Navy, this 
 militarisation of Anglo-Chinese relations has been under way for some time, albeit 
with surprisingly little challenge or debate. In February 2019 Gavin Williamson said 
that HMS Queen Elizabeth, the first of the aircraft carriers, would be deployed to the 
South China Sea. The Prime Minister’s foreword to the Integrated Review, which 
 confirmed that the carrier strike group would pass through the Mediterranean and on 
to the Indo-Pacific in 2021, was less explicit. Defence in a competitive age, by advertis-
ing the carrier strike group’s integration with the US Navy and US Marine Corps, 
implied a British readiness to support the United States within what China calls ‘the 
first island chain’. 
All four of Britain’s ‘five-eyes’ intelligence-sharing partners are Pacific powers. For 
some time, three of them, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, have been balancing 
their defence relationship with the fifth, the US, with their economic interests. As they 
have cleaved to America for security, they have turned to China for trade. Other Pacific 
powers located closer to Asia’s mainland, from Singapore through to the Philippines 
and then Japan, have been behaving similarly. China’s assertiveness and, in particular, 
its explicit claim to Taiwan have made this balancing act increasingly hard to sustain. 
The United States has responded by imposing a form of deterrence in the western 
Pacific which relies on very rapid escalation in order to manage a crisis which could 
emerge at any moment. Talk of a renewed Cold War in Europe misses the point in 
relation to east Asia: here, as the Demilitarized Zone in Korea testifies, the Cold War 
never ended. Peace has not been fully established and its maintenance rests on a 
hair-trigger.8 
Those dangers, coupled with economic imperatives, mean that the rising tensions 
are in turn causing rifts among the democratic powers. New Zealand has refused to 
bow to US pressure to see ‘the five-eyes partnership’ as a military alliance in embryo; 
its ANZAC partner, Australia, has gone the other way, proving ready to jeopardise its 
7 Ministry of Defence (2021: 5, paras 1.1, 1.5; 9, paras 2.3, 2.4).
8 See Caverley & Dombrowski (2020).
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trade with China in pursuit of increasingly robust conventional deterrence. Despite its 
physical distance, Britain has advertised its desire to be part of a Pacific alliance. The 
Prime Minister floated the idea of a NATO for the Pacific and the Defence Command 
Paper calls on NATO to respond to the ‘systemic threat’ posed by China. It also men-
tions bilateral relations with South Korea and the plan to create a defence staff  in 
Canberra. Recent press articles have floated possible British alliances with Japan and 
even with Taiwan, although the latter is not even a formal ally of the United States.9 
The carrier strike group therefore bears a heavy burden of foreign policy 
 expectation. It signals to the United States that Britain is ready to support it in the 
Pacific just as Britain assumes that the US will honour its maritime obligations in the 
‘Euro-Atlantic’. The facts, that in military terms the carrier strike group makes only a 
marginal difference to the naval balance in the western Pacific and that its presence 
would probably hamper the escalatory mechanics of US deterrence in the event of a 
crisis, seem to be less important than the attractions of the carrier group’s capacity for 
‘influence’ with regional allies and other democratic powers. The United States would 
probably prefer the United Kingdom to ‘back-fill’ in areas closer to home in order to 
offset the overstretch to which even the US is subject. That would cut the Royal Navy’s 
carbon emissions and the massive fuel costs incurred by such deployments. The 
Integrated Review is silent on how frequent they will be. Defence in a competitive age 
asserts that the carrier strike group is ‘permanently [emphasis added] available to 
NATO, an embodiment of an unwavering commitment to the defence and deterrence 
of the Euro-Atlantic area’.10 That statement is immediately contradicted in the follow-
ing sentence, which describes the carrier strike group’s deployment to the Indo-Pacific. 
All the eye-catching attention devoted to the carriers neglects the fact that they are 
accompanied by frigates, destroyers and other assets regularly and routinely required 
in the ‘Euro-Atlantic’. They have to be present to be effective, whether the purpose is 
to defend or to deter, and they cannot be in two different oceans at the same time. This 
is ‘gesture strategy’. It is also deeply dangerous, giving mixed messages to allies and 
adversaries alike, and risking war by accident and inadvertence.
The strategic implications of operational concepts
The Integrated Operating Concept provides a doctrine for a joint force capable of 
fighting simultaneously in five domains – land, sea, air, cyber and space – with con-
verging effects. The doctrine’s components are mutually reinforcing and intellectually 
9 For an alternative approach, see Porter & Mazarr (2021).
10 Ministry of Defence (2021: 14). 
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self-sufficient. As a result, the Integrated Review process was characterised by an 
unusual degree of unanimity among the chiefs of staff, with inter-service rivalry 
 notable by its absence. That may have been assisted by COVID-19, which focused 
press attention elsewhere and gave few opportunities for informal networking and 
single-service lobbying, but it was also helped by the conversion of Joint Forces 
Command into Strategic Command and its emergence – not least through its 
 development of the Integrated Operating Concept – as a primus inter pares among the 
single-service chiefs. 
The vision of armed conflict on which the Integrated Operating Concept and its 
product, Defence in a competitive age, rest relies on technological innovation as a force 
multiplier. The regular army, whose strength is set at 72,500, will be weaker in man-
power terms than at any point since 1792. When that point is made, commentators 
rarely also observe that the navy has probably never had so few platforms in its entire 
existence. Such comparisons are dismissed on the grounds that the personnel of 
today’s armed forces are better educated and more skilled than their predecessors, and 
that the systems they operate are more capable and more lethal than even those of 
three decades ago, let alone three centuries. In a hot war today, small forces can be 
disproportionately more effective than they were in the two world wars or even in the 
1st Gulf War. However, similar advantages apply to the peer competitors against 
whom such capabilities need to be matched. The British armed forces are not seeking 
relative advantage over the enemies of yesterday but those of today and tomorrow. 
The Integrated Operating Concept rests on the assumption that forces themselves do 
not have to be massed in order to concentrate their fires; it also relies on the very high 
kill probabilities conferred by satellite intelligence and precision guidance. Such a 
heavy reliance on the control of cyberspace would become a vulnerability were it lost, 
with secure connectivity forfeit and forces fighting blind. Moreover, the premium put 
on engaging the enemy at a distance, which in turn might justify the possible gaps in 
the capability of the deployable division, is at odds with the recent experience of heavy 
fighting at close quarters in urban areas.11 
Given that the Defence Command Paper assumes that its two principal  adversaries 
are major states possessed of considerable military sophistication, this technocratic 
vision of armed conflict may be sustainable in terms of tactics and operations. It is 
supported too at the strategic level by its assumption – asserted with less equivocation 
than in any recent National Security Strategy – that Britain would not be fighting 
alone. The question is with whom. The more the United States has recognised the 
limitations on its power, opting in consequence for its own ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific, the 
more desperate has been the United Kingdom’s embrace and the more muddled its 
11 See King (2021).
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relations with its European allies. Given that, the Integrated Review could have 
 advocated greater role and capability specialisation within NATO, to which Britain 
itself  contributes with the carrier strike group and its plans to introduce new SSBNs. 
Instead it maintains the appearance of a ‘full-spectrum’ and ‘balanced’ force, albeit 
without the scale implicit in such adjectives.
None of this means that the Integrated Operating Concept does not carry  strategic 
opportunity costs. Like other allies, Britain compromises its own freedom of action 
when it commits itself  to collective defence. That has long been explicit in the ‘Euro-
Atlantic’ thanks to its commitment to NATO’s Article 5. The United States, having 
widened the geographical reach of Article 5 eastwards in the aftermath of the Cold 
War, now wants to extend it again to embrace Ukraine, so increasing the risks of esca-
lation and further complicating its security relationship with Russia. Britain, in its 
determination to be a loyal ally and effective partner of the United States, seems 
 anxious to go even further by adding the Indo-Pacific, a so-called ‘region’ which effec-
tively embraces not only half  the world, but also its largest ocean and its busiest sea. 
Nor does ‘Global Britain’ end there: it puts no clear geographical limit on where it 
might fight. Defence in a competitive age, reflecting the thinking in the Integrated 
Operating Concept, says it aims to evolve 
from a force that is primarily designed for the contingency of a major conflict and 
warfighting, to one that is also designed for permanent and persistent global engage-
ment. To succeed in the era of systemic competition we will need to be front-footed. 
We and our allies and partners must drive the tempo of strategic activity rather than 
responding to others. That requires a different way of thinking. It requires as much 
focus on how the force is postured and used as on its structure. It requires a mindset 
that is based on continuous campaigning, seeing all activity as part of an overall 
 operational design.12
Applied globally, such a vision, given its commitment to recurrent unaccompanied 
postings to potentially volatile locations, carries profound implications for serving 
personnel in terms of what used to be called ‘harmony guidelines’. There is little use 
in having a workforce that is highly skilled and professionally educated if  it cannot be 
retained, and pragmatic and sensible reforms, like lateral entry and career breaks, may 
prove to be no more than palliatives. Small but elite forces have little inherent slack. In 
recent years, much time and effort have been devoted to bringing the armed forces 
back to the UK, to integrating them and their families in civilian life, to encouraging 
them to find permanent homes, and to ensuring – through enshrining the Armed 
Forces Covenant in law – that they suffer no disadvantage. 
12 Ministry of Defence (2021: 12, para 3.6).
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Here, however, the concern is more with the strategic logic inherent in the notion 
of ‘continuous campaigning’. The proposal is that, by engaging early in potential 
trouble spots, the armed forces can act pre-emptively by establishing defence partner-
ships in other countries, by training the forces of those that need assistance, and by 
signalling a readiness to act in areas of the world where Britain shores up deterrence. 
None of this is credible unless it is reinforced and upheld by the readiness to fight if  
required. Training others’ armed forces relies – as the British Army learned in Iraq 
and Afghanistan – on being ready to accompany them into battle and, if  necessary, to 
kill and be killed. It also risks backing a state whose commitment to democratic norms 
may not be consonant with the ‘rules’ which Britain says it supports, such as human 
rights or the rejection of torture. It might create an army prepared to topple its own 
government or to change sides in a civil war. Nor is it clear that the vision sketched out 
in Global Britain has recognised the domestic political consequences of a proposed 
force structure that could put British service personnel in harm’s way in countries of 
which the electorate knows little and about which it may care less.
What the doctrine does not make entirely clear is which are the opponents that 
‘continuous campaigning’ is designed to thwart in an era of ‘constant competition’. 
At one level it suggests that the ‘global war on terror’, now more conventionally 
rebranded as the ‘long war’, goes on – and it does, in Sahel, the Horn of Africa, 
Mozambique and the Middle East. It looks likely to persist in Afghanistan. The 
Integrated Review was published before the US decision to withdraw from the latter 
by September 2021, and Britain, in company with other European allies, has quietly 
indicated – or at least both the Chief of the Defence Staff  and the head of MI6 have 
done so publicly, even if  ministers have been silent – its disappointment. But if  
pre-empting international terrorism at its source is the objective of the Integrated 
Operating Concept, that aim is not much in evidence in either Global Britain or the 
Defence Command Paper. Because the context here dwells on state competitors using 
‘hybrid war’, ‘grey-zone warfare’ and cyber, ‘continuous campaigning’ seems targeted 
more at countering subversion and proxy warfare of the sort used by Russia, Iran and 
China below the level of open warfare. Parallels with the so-called ‘global Cold War’, 
waged by the US and the Soviet Union in Latin America, the Middle East and sub- 
Saharan Africa come to mind. The questions begged by the Integrated Operating 
Concept are twofold. The first is a general one: whether one size will fit all conditions, 
irrespective of distance, culture, economic development and regional context. Is ‘con-
tinuous campaigning’ designed to suppress terrorists and insurgents in the Horn of 
Africa or to deter China by supplementing the plans of the US Marine Corps to 
 conduct ‘expeditionary advanced base operations’ in the islands of the western Pacific? 
The second relates to whether, if  the doctrine fails to contain the problems which it is 
designed to address, Britain is ready to escalate its response. The Integrated Operating 
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Concept might require Britain, not its adversaries, to be the first to use actual 
violence. 
The strategic implications go further. The statements in Global Britain and Defence 
in a competitive age on nuclear deterrence make clear – logically enough – that nuclear 
weapons will be integrated in Britain’s vision for fighting major wars. The expanded 
geographical reach of British ambitions has been cited as one reason why the Integrated 
Review abandoned the intention to reduce the number of Britain’s nuclear warheads 
to 180 and instead proposed to increase them to a possible maximum of 260. Others 
have suggested that the higher figure may be a signal to the US as Britain brings the 
Dreadnought class into service and as America reviews its options for new nuclear 
warheads. In 1982 Britain, which relies on the US for its nuclear warheads and had 
planned its programme around the Trident I or C 4 missile, was caught out by 
Washington’s decision to retire it prematurely in favour of the D 5. Either way, the 
point remains that British deterrence, while it rests on conventional capabilities in 
the first instance, resides ultimately in nuclear weapons. Extending the geographical 
range over which conventional forces are distributed, while reducing their numbers, 
lessens the credibility of their deterrent effects short of war. It also limits their  capacity 
to sustain losses if  war becomes protracted. Both tendencies could steepen and shorten 
the ladder of escalation to the nuclear level. 
The Integrated Review therefore demands a more substantive discussion on 
nuclear deterrence than that to which Britain has become accustomed. The ‘tilt to the 
Indo-Pacific’ takes Britain to a region where there is not just one adversarial nuclear 
power, Russia, but two. Moreover, they and the United States are not the only 
 nuclear-armed players in the area; India and Pakistan have to be taken into account 
as well. Cold War debates come to mind. How far can the umbrella of nuclear escala-
tion be spread? Europeans were distrustful of the US concept of extended deterrence, 
calculating that in reality no president would place US cities at risk of a retaliatory 
second strike if  there were a Soviet attack in Europe. By the same token, it is hard to 
see an Asiatic power putting its faith in the credibility of a deterrent based in the 
United Kingdom – or at least not without sufficient evidence of a sustained British 
commitment to Pacific security, with perhaps a consequent derogation of that in the 
Euro-Atlantic. Certainly it would need more than an occasional visit by a carrier 
strike group. 
On the other hand the US might change its Cold War position. During the Cold 
War, London argued that the British independent nuclear deterrent would complicate 
the decision-making of NATO’s adversaries in a crisis. Then the US tended to pooh-
pooh the case for a ‘second finger on the trigger’, but today Washington finds its own 
resources stretched. It also confronts an inflection point in the strategy surrounding 
nuclear weapons, with the suspension of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
176 Hew Strachan
(INF) agreement in 2019. In one of his first actions as president, Joe Biden agreed to 
Russia’s request that the two powers renew the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START), to reduce nuclear weapons. But China is not party to START – and nor is 
Britain. These considerations heighten the risks of inadvertent escalation or miscalcu-
lation in a region where the stabilising effects of the Cold War legacy have not left the 
same mark as in Europe. By the same token, however, such fears in turn – at least in 
the paradoxical world of nuclear weapons theory – themselves reinforce deterrence. 
Is nuclear deterrence how the Integrated Review will square its strategic circle? 
Britain is developing forces which are more effective but smaller for a strategy that 
embraces not one continent but two (and possibly more), not one of the world’s 
oceans but both (and a melting Arctic as well), and takes on two major opponents at 
the same time. It could find itself  confronting both Russia and China simultaneously, 
either because they decide to make common cause or, more probably, because Russia 
would exploit the opportunities in Europe which a Pacific crisis might present. It is 
not clear that Global Britain in a Competitive Age has grasped these realities, or – if  it 
has – that Britain is ready to communicate them in such blunt terms to its adversaries 
or to its allies, or even to its own people. As well as defining strategy, another novelty 
of the review is that it makes unfashionably frequent use of the word diplomacy. 
Rather than drive Russia and China together, it might be sensible to disaggregate 
them, using diplomacy to achieve détente with at least one, and – given the extreme 
perils involved – ideally both.
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